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In the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1995), two incumbent 
governments attempt to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA), while special interest groups 
in each country influence negotiations by offering financial contributions to their 
governments. As a consequence, a set of politically sensitive industries is excluded from the 
proposed FTA. Using the empirical methodology of Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara 
(2001), this paper shows that the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model successfully predicts the 
set of excluded industries for the recently implemented Australia-United States FTA. It is also 
shown that the set of exclusions favours Australian interest groups, which could indicate that 
the gains from the FTA are lower for the government of Australia than for the government of 
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Interest groups, also known as special interest groups or lobby groups, play a major role 
in the political processes of democracies. During election campaigns, for example, interest 
groups influence voting behaviour by issuing public endorsements of their preferred 
candidates, and by making financial contributions that candidates spend on advertising and 
other campaign activities. By issuing endorsements and financial contributions, an interest 
group can improve the electoral prospects of candidates that support the interest group's 
stance on key policy issues. This raises the expected welfare of members of the interest group, 
since it increases the likelihood that a future government will make policy decisions that are 
favourable to the interest group. 
Endorsements and campaign contributions also benefit interest group members in another 
way. If electoral candidates are aware that interest groups will offer endorsements and 
contributions during the course of a campaign, then candidates will compete for the support of 
interest groups, which may result in candidates amending their policy announcements to suit 
the desires of certain interest groups. Therefore, interest groups have the power to directly 
influence the policy proposals of electoral candidates. This is true even if offers of 
endorsements and financial contributions are not made explicit, since their mere possibility 
may be enough to induce competition among candidates. 
Incumbent governments can be influenced in the same way. Interest groups often publicly 
declare whether they support or oppose the policy proposals of incumbent governments, and 
interest groups routinely give campaign contributions even when there is no formal election 
campaign under way. Governments value this kind of support because public endorsements of 
policy can influence future voting behaviour, and financial contributions can be spent during 
 1future election campaigns or to provide immediate benefits such as improved party offices. 
Therefore, just like electoral candidates, incumbent governments seek to win the support of 
interest groups, which can be done by making adjustments to policy proposals. 
The political economy approach to the analysis of policy formation explains these 
processes by viewing politicians and governments as rational agents, who maximise a welfare 
function that places value on their own welfare as well as on the welfare of voters. In an 
influential paper, Grossman and Helpman (1994) apply this approach to the analysis of 
international trade policy, constructing a model that predicts the schedule of import tariffs 
chosen by a government that is influenced by domestic interest groups. In Grossman and 
Helpman (1995), this model is extended to the international level to allow two countries to 
engage in negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA). It is shown that FTA negotiations are 
usually more likely to succeed if a small number of industries can be excluded from the 
agreement, and for any two countries, the model predicts which industries are most likely to 
be excluded. 
In this paper, the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model is applied to the Australia-United 
States FTA. The Australia-United States FTA came into force on 1 January 2005, after 
considerable debate and repeated rounds of negotiations by the two countries. A number of 
industries are excluded from the agreement, or subject to extended transition periods that 
effectively also constitute exclusions. Most of these exclusions are in agricultural industries, 
food/beverages/tobacco industries, and textiles/clothing/footwear industries. The aim of this 
paper is to test whether the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model can predict this set of excluded 
industries. This is done using the empirical methodology of Gawande, Sanguinetti, and 
Bohara (2001), who conduct a similar test for the Mercosur regional FTA. 
 
 22. Literature 
The literature on the political economy of trade policy attempts to explain why political 
processes often give rise to inefficient, protectionist trade policies. Rodrik (1995) and 
Helpman (1997) provide an overview of the major models that have been developed. Among 
these is the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), which focuses on the influence of 
domestic interest groups over an incumbent government, and provides a solution for the 
equilibrium set of import tariffs. In this model, interest groups offer financial contributions to 
the government, with the amount of contributions by each interest group depending on the 
government's ultimate choice of tariff rate in the corresponding industry. The government 
chooses a set of tariff rates that maximises a welfare function, which depends on aggregate 
social welfare as well as the sum of financial contributions received from interest groups.
1 
This model has been empirically tested on a number of occasions. Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) find strong support using data for the 
United States, and McCalman (2004) finds supportive evidence using data for Australia. 
Since its initial development, the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model has been extended in 
several ways. Feenstra (2004, Chapter 9) describes the major extensions. One extension is the 
model of Grossman and Helpman (1995), where two countries are allowed to enter into 
negotiations for a free trade agreement.
2 In this extended model, each country's trade policy is 
determined by a two-stage strategic game. In the first stage, interest groups and the 
government interact at the domestic level, as described earlier in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), while in the second stage, the two countries bargain at the international level in an 
                                                 
1 Interest groups make financial contributions with the direct intention of influencing the 
government's policy choices, even though legislation frequently prohibits such behaviour. 
2 Levy (1997) investigates FTAs in the context of a different political economy model. 
 3attempt to negotiate an FTA. The model identifies conditions that increase the likelihood that 
these negotiations will succeed, and in particular, it is shown that a proposed FTA usually has 
a higher chance of success if a small number of politically sensitive industries are excluded 
from the agreement. For any two countries, the model also predicts the set of industries most 
likely to be excluded if an FTA is formed. 
Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2001) conduct an empirical test of the Grossman-
Helpman (1995) model, using data for Argentina and Brazil. Together with their smaller 
neighbours Uruguay and Paraguay, these countries formed a regional FTA in 1995, known as 
Mercosur. Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara find that the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model 
successfully predicts the set of excluded industries for this agreement. This paper uses the 
methodology of Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara to test whether the Grossman-Helpman 
(1995) model can predict the set of excluded industries for the Australia-United States FTA. 
 
3. Theory 
3.1 Interest Groups and Trade Policy 
A key result of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model is an equation describing the 
equilibrium choice of trade tariffs and subsidies by an incumbent government, which receives 
financial contributions from domestic special interest groups. This result, which is derived 
below, holds for a single country that is not involved in any trade agreements with other 
countries. For each industry, the magnitude of the equilibrium tariff or subsidy effectively 
provides a ranking of the relative desirability, from the point of view of the government, of 
including that industry in a free trade agreement with the rest of the world. A modified form 
 4of this ranking is used later in this paper to investigate the choice of industry exclusions from 
the Australia-United States FTA. 
The following derivation follows Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and McCalman (2004), 
who provide a slight simplification of the original Grossman-Helpman (1994) framework. 
The model assumes a small open economy, consisting of a continuum of individuals with 
identical preferences, and a population size equal to one. Individuals seek to maximise their 
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individual's demand for good i is given by 
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gained from each of the nonnumeraire goods. 
Good 0 is produced using only labour, with constant returns to scale and an input-output 
coefficient equal to one, and therefore the wage rate is also equal to one. Each of the other n 
goods is produced using labour and a sector-specific input. The return to the specific factor 
used in the production of good i is given by the profit function  ) ( i i p π , and the supply 
function for good i is found using Hotelling's lemma,  ) ( ) ( i i i i p p y π′ = . 
 5The government's policy options consist of trade taxes and subsidies. The domestic price 
of a good exceeds the exogenous world price if the government imposes an import tax or an 
export subsidy, and the domestic price is lower than the world price in the case of an import 
subsidy or an export tax. The government is assumed to redistribute tariff revenue equally 
among all voters, in the form of lump-sum payments. 
Aggregate income, which is also equal to aggregate expenditure, is given by the sum of 
labour income, returns to specific factors, and tariff revenue. Aggregate welfare can therefore 
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In some exogenous subset L of the n industries, the owners of the specific factors are 
assumed to form special interest groups. Each interest group offers the government financial 
incentives to choose trade policies that result in a high domestic price   for the good 
produced by the corresponding industry. Individuals are too "small" to influence the 
government, so only interest groups make financial contributions. The total welfare of the 
interest group representing industry i is equal to the sum of the indirect utilities of all 
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where  i α  is the fraction of the voting population that owns specific factor i, and each 
individual is assumed to own one unit of labour and at most one type of specific factor. 
 6The objective of interest group i is to maximise its net welfare, 
i i C W −  
where the financial contributions paid to the government are represented by  , and these 
contributions depend on the trade policies chosen by the government. 
i C
The government's objective is to maximise a weighted sum of aggregate social welfare 
and total financial contributions received from interest groups. This can be represented by the 






Aggregate social welfare is denoted by W, and a is a measure of the government's valuation of 
aggregate welfare relative to financial contributions. The government values aggregate 
welfare because voters are assumed to be more likely to re-elect a government that has 
improved their standard of living, and the government values financial contributions because 
these can be spent during election campaigns to increase the chance of re-election. 
To find the equilibrium trade policies, Grossman and Helpman (1994) use a "menu 
auction" framework. The approach used here is somewhat simpler, following Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999) and McCalman (2004). The interactions between the government and the 
interest groups are assumed to take the form of a Nash bargaining game. At the solution of 
this game, trade policies are chosen to maximise the joint surplus of the government and all 
interest groups. This joint surplus is given by 
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where   is the share of voters that are represented by interest groups, and   is an 
indicator variable that equals one if 
∑∈ =
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L i∈  and zero otherwise. If   is equal to one, industry i 
is said to be "politically organised", since it is represented by an organised interest group. 
i I
The equilibrium tariffs and subsidies are then found from the first-order condition with 
respect to the domestic price of good i, 
0 ) ( ) ( ) (






















































where   is the ad valorem import tariff or export subsidy (positive), or import 
subsidy or export tax (negative) for good i; 
* * / ) ( i i i i p p p t − =
i i i m y z / =  is the ratio of domestic output to 
imports (or exports if   is negative); and   is the import demand elasticity (positive) or 
export supply elasticity (negative). 
i m i e
Equation (3) reveals the equilibrium trade policies that result from domestic political 
interactions between an incumbent government and various special interest groups. These 
trade policies particularly benefit industries that (i) are politically organised, (ii) have large 
absolute values of  , and (iii) have small absolute values of  . A large absolute value of    i z i e i z
 8indicates that the ratio of domestic output to imports or exports is high, so the economy has 
relatively little to lose from an import tariff or export subsidy, while the owners of the specific 
factor have much to gain. A small absolute value of   means that the elasticity of import 
demand or export supply is low, in which case the deadweight loss associated with protection 
will also be low. 
i e
For each good i, the interest group representing the producers lobbies for positive 
protection, which would increase domestic prices. However, all other interest groups lobby 
for negative protection for good i, since the members of these other interest groups consume 
good i but do not produce it. In the equilibrium, politically organised industries ( ) are 
usually given positive protection (import tariffs or export subsidies), and unorganised 
industries ( ) experience negative protection (import subsidies or export taxes). 
1 = i I
0 = i I
Two notable special cases exist. Firstly, if all voters belong to interest groups ( 1 = L α ) 
and all industries are politically organised ( 1 = i I  for all i), then the competing demands of 
interest groups neutralise each other, and the equilibrium is free trade in all goods. Secondly, 
if only a negligible fraction of voters belongs to interest groups ( 0 = L α ), then interest groups 
have nothing to gain from lobbying for negative protection for goods that their members 
consume. Therefore, interest groups lobby only for positive protection for the goods that their 
members produce, and in the equilibrium, only politically organised industries experience any 
trade taxes or subsidies. 















 9In section 4, equation (4) is adapted to the two-country case and used to rank each industry 
according to the relative desirability, from the point of view of the government of either 
Australia or the United States, of including that industry in a bilateral free trade agreement. 
 
3.2 Free Trade Agreements 
In the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model of free trade agreements, the Grossman-
Helpman (1994) model discussed previously is treated as the first stage in the "game" of 
negotiating an FTA. In this first stage, the government of each country, under the influence of 
domestic interest groups, independently determines the schedule of trade tariffs and subsidies 
for that country. Then, in the second stage, the governments interact at the international level 
in an effort to negotiate an FTA. 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) begin by describing the effects that a bilateral FTA can 
have on the voters and interest groups in each country. For simplicity, it is assumed that only 
one-way trade is possible for each good. Then, for each good, an FTA can result in "enhanced 
protection", "reduced protection", or an intermediate case.
3 The analysis of these situations 
shows that exporters never lose from an FTA, and sometimes gain, while import-competing 
producers never gain from an FTA, and sometimes lose. This implies that in each country, 
interest groups representing exporters are a potential source of political support for an FTA, 
and interest groups representing import-competing producers are a potential source of 
opposition. The welfare effects on consumers can be either positive or negative. 
A country will enter into an FTA only if the government supports the agreement. 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) assume that the objectives of the government and interest 
                                                 
3 See Grossman and Helpman (1995, pp. 671–673). 
 10groups in each country are as in the earlier model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), so that 
each government is concerned with both aggregate social welfare and the sum of financial 
contributions received from interest groups. For the special case where only a negligible 
fraction of voters belongs to interest groups (as in equation 4), and, for simplicity, all 
industries are politically organised, Grossman and Helpman (1995) investigate the possible 
equilibrium outcomes of FTA negotiations. Two different types of negotiations are analysed. 
The first type of negotiations requires FTAs to cover all industries, with no exceptions, so 
that any FTA results in completely free trade in goods between the countries involved. A 
government will support such an FTA only if it causes the joint welfare of the government 
and all interest groups in that country to increase, which can be written as: 
() 0 ≥ Δ + Δ − Δ ∑ G C W
i
i i  
This condition can be simplified by substituting  i i W π Δ = Δ  for the change in welfare of the 
interest groups, which follows from equation (1) for the special case where  0 = i α ; and by 
substituting  ( ) ∑ Δ + Δ = Δ
i i i Z a C G  for the change in government welfare, which follows from 
equation (2). The term   represents the change in aggregate social welfare W due to the 
reduction of trade barriers in industry i. This gives 
i Z Δ
( 0 ≥ Δ + Δ ∑
i
i i Z a π )  (5) 
An FTA that covers all industries can be successfully negotiated only if condition (5) 
holds in each country. This is most likely to occur when potential trade between the 
negotiating countries is relatively "balanced", meaning that in each country there must be an 
approximately equal number of potential exporters and import-competing producers. Then, 
 11the political power of interest groups representing exporters, who gain from the agreement, 
matches the political power of interest groups representing import-competing producers, who 
lose. Additionally, this type of FTA is more likely to succeed if the number of industries 
experiencing enhanced protection is high relative to the number experiencing reduced 
protection. Under enhanced protection, the gains to exporters are high and the costs to import-
competing producers are low, while under reduced protection the opposite is true. Therefore, 
if most industries experience enhanced protection, the gains to exporters are likely to 




The second type of FTA negotiations allows for a small number of industries to be 
excluded from the agreement. Many FTAs take this form, including the Australia-United 
States FTA. According to the rules of the World Trade Organization, industry exclusions are 
permitted as long as an FTA still removes trade barriers on "substantially all" trade in goods 
between the countries involved (WTO, 2005), although the precise meaning of "substantially 
all" is not made explicit. Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that when industry exclusions 
are permitted, FTA negotiations are more likely to succeed. This is because excluding certain 
industries can allow countries to negotiate a "balanced" agreement, even if total potential 
trade between those countries is relatively unbalanced. 
If industry exclusions are permitted, then a government will support an FTA as long as it 
increases the joint welfare of the government and those interest groups representing industries 
that are included in the agreement. This can be written as 
                                                 
4 Enhanced protection is a situation of trade diversion, so this also implies that FTAs tend to 
be successful when trade diversion prevails. 
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where  ) (T ε  is the set of excluded industries and T represents an exogenous constraint on this 
set, in accordance with WTO regulations. For simplicity, this constraint is assumed to be a 
limit on the number of industries that may be excluded.
5 Note that depending on the choice of 
) (T ε , a proposed FTA may satisfy condition (6) but not condition (5). 
Let  i i i Z a g Δ + Δ = π . Then each government would like to have all industries with   
(for that country) included in the agreement, and all industries with 
0 > i g
0 < i g  excluded, since the 
inclusion of an industry with   would reduce the joint welfare of the government and the 
interest group representing that industry. If there is a constraint T on the set of exclusions, 
then each government seeks to exclude the industries with the most negative values of  . 
This set of desired exclusions is generally different for each country, and, as a consequence, 
negotiations for this type of FTA tend to involve extensive bargaining. Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) use the concept of a Nash bargaining solution to analyse the equilibrium 
outcome of this bargaining process for the two-country case. It is shown that if an equilibrium 
agreement exists, it excludes those industries whose inclusion would have the largest negative 
effect on a geometric weighted average of the overall net gains to the two governments. 
0 < i g
i g





A g g ω ω +  (7) 
where   is an overall weighting given to the net gains of each government during 
negotiations, and the two countries are denoted 
J ω
B A J , = . For each government,   depends 
J ω
                                                 
5 Another possibility is a limit on the fraction of trade within the FTA that may be excluded. 
 13on two factors. Firstly, it increases with the Nash weight associated with that government, 
where the Nash weight is an exogenous measure of bargaining strength. Secondly, it 
decreases with the size of the total net gains of that government, since a government with 
large gains at stake will be more willing to compromise in order to reach an agreement. 
The equilibrium agreement excludes all industries with a value of expression (7) below 
some critical value, which depends on the constraint T. In the case where T is simply a limit 
on the number of industries that may be excluded, the equilibrium agreement excludes the T 
industries with the largest negative values of (7). These are the industries for which the 
weighted sum of the gains to the exporting country's government and the losses to the 
importing country's government (due to the inclusion of that industry) are most negative. 
If the weightings   are approximately equal for the two countries, then industries that 
would experience reduced protection under the agreement are most likely to be excluded, and 
industries that would experience enhanced protection are least likely to be excluded. This is 
because for industries that would experience reduced protection, the potential gains to the 
exporting country are small and the losses of producers in the importing country are large, 
making expression (7) negative if the weightings are equal. By contrast, for industries that 
would experience enhanced protection, the potential gains to exporters are large and the losses 
in the importing country are small, so (7) is positive if the weightings are equal. In the 
intermediate case between enhanced and reduced protection, expression (7) may be either 
positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of the gains to the exporting country and 
the losses to the importing country. 
J ω
However, the weightings   need not be equal. If one country has a relatively high 
exogenous bargaining strength, or if the agreement provides the country with only relatively 




 14country's wishes are weighted more heavily during negotiations, so some industries may be 
excluded even if their inclusion would deliver large gains to the other country. An extreme 
case occurs when   equals zero for one country, which implies that the set of exclusions is 
determined entirely by the other country. It may also be possible for   to be negative for 
one country, in which case the set of exclusions consists of the industries that this country 




4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
4.1 Empirical Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to test whether the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) can 
predict the set of industry exclusions for the Australia-United States FTA. The empirical 
methodology used to conduct this test follows Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2001). The 
central idea underlying this methodology is to establish a link between the Grossman-
Helpman (1995) model of FTA negotiations (see section 3.2), and the Grossman-Helpman 
(1994) model of a single country's equilibrium trade policies (see section 3.1). 
In the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model, an equilibrium FTA excludes the T industries 
with the largest negative values of expression (7), where T is an exogenous constraint on the 
number of exclusions. Therefore, to test whether the exclusions of the Australia-United States 
FTA are correctly predicted, industries must be ranked according to expression (7). This 
requires, for each country, a ranking of industries by  , which is the change in the joint 
welfare of the government and the interest group representing industry i, caused by the 
inclusion of industry i in the agreement. 
i g
 15Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2001) show that such a ranking can be generated by a 
modified form of equation (4), the Grossman-Helpman (1994) solution for the size of the 
equilibrium import tariff or export subsidy in each industry before the FTA is negotiated (for 
the special case where  0 = L α ). Intuitively, equation (4) implies that a pre-FTA equilibrium 
import tariff exists in some import-competing industry if the reduction of imports in that 
industry (through the imposition of the tariff) increases the joint welfare of the government 
and the interest group representing the industry. Hence, this joint welfare will fall if import 
restrictions are reduced by an FTA. Similarly, a pre-FTA export subsidy exists in an export 
industry if the expansion of exports (through the subsidy) increases the joint welfare of the 
government and the interest group representing the industry, and hence this joint welfare will 
rise further if exports are expanded through an FTA. 
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Xi e z I e z I / / × = ×  for export industries. As in 
equation (4),   is an indicator variable that equals one if industry i is politically organised 
(in country J) and zero otherwise, and   is the import demand elasticity (positive) or export 
supply elasticity (negative). However,   is now defined as the ratio of domestic output to 
bilateral imports (positive) or bilateral exports (negative). Previously, in equation (4),   
was defined as the ratio of domestic output to total imports or exports. This change is made 









For import-competing industries, a ranking by ( )
J
Mi e z I / ×  is equivalent to a ranking by 
. This is because, firstly, the index 
J
i g ( )
J
Mi e z I / ×  varies positively with the size of the 
equilibrium tariff on bilateral imports (which can be seen from equation 4). Secondly, the size 
of the equilibrium tariff varies negatively with the change in the joint welfare of the 
 16government and the interest group representing industry i, caused by a tariff reduction of a 
given magnitude. Then, since a tariff reduction on bilateral imports of good i has the same 
effect on trade flows as the inclusion of industry i in a bilateral FTA, the size of the 
equilibrium tariff also varies negatively with  . Putting this together, it is found that 
 varies negatively with  , and therefore, a ranking of import-competing 
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Similarly, for export industries, a ranking by ( )
J
Xi e z I / ×  is equivalent to a ranking by  . 





Xi e z I / ×  varies positively 
with the size of the equilibrium subsidy on bilateral exports (see equation 4), and since a 
subsidy on bilateral exports has the same effect on trade flows as the inclusion of the industry 
in a bilateral FTA, the index   also varies positively with  .  (
J
Xi e z I / × )
J
i g
When the (reversed) ranking of import-competing industries by ( )
J
Mi e z I / ×  is added to 
the ranking of export industries by ( , a ranking of all industries is produced, which 
is identical to a ranking by  . An industry's position within this ranking reveals the relative 
desirability, from the point of view of the government of country J, of including that industry 
in a bilateral FTA. During negotiations for such an FTA, the wishes of each country are given 
some weighting (corresponding to   in expression 7), and a combined ranking is established 
for the two countries. The equilibrium set of excluded industries then consists of the T 
industries that are lowest on this combined ranking. This is equivalent to the Grossman-
Helpman (1995) prediction that the set of excluded industries consists of the T industries with 
the largest negative values of expression (7). 
)
J




 17Since the indexes ( )
J
Mi e z I / ×  and ( )
J
Xi e z I / ×  are constructed from observable variables, 
this combined ranking of industries can be calculated for any two countries, given values of 
the weightings  . This allows the following econometric specification (from Gawande, 
Sanguinetti, and Bohara, 2001) to be used to test whether the Grossman-Helpman (1995) 
model can predict the set of industry exclusions for the Australia-United States FTA. 
J ω








Mi i e z I e z I e z I e z I y ε β β β β β + × + × + × + × + = / / / / 4 3 2 1 0  (8) 
The dependent variable,  , is a binary indicator variable that equals one if industry i is 
excluded from the FTA, and zero if it is included. The coefficients 
i y
1 β  and  2 β  are country 
weights for Australia, while  3 β  and  4 β  are country weights for the United States. These 
weights are similar to   in expression (7), but are allowed to vary between the import and 
export sectors. As in expression (7), the weights for each country depend positively on the 
government's exogenous bargaining strength, and negatively on the size of the total net gains 
to the government. 
J ω
The two countries are said to be "symmetric" if bargaining strengths and total net gains 
from the agreement are each approximately equal. In this symmetric case, the theory predicts 
that the estimated coefficients for the two import variables will be non-negative 
( 0 1 ≥ β , 0 3 ≥ β ) and the estimated coefficients for the two export variables will be 
non-positive ( 0 2 ≤ β ,  0 4 ≤ β ); and that there will be no significant differences in magnitude 
between the estimates of  1 β  and  3 β  or between the estimates of  2 β  and  4 β . 
If the estimated coefficients do not follow these patterns, then the countries are not 
symmetric. This would imply that one of the two countries was able to secure relatively more 
of the industry exclusions that it sought. For example, if one of the four coefficients is found 
 18to equal zero, then the FTA does not contain the exclusions that were desired by the interest 
groups in the import or export sector that corresponds to that coefficient. In the extreme case, 
if one of the coefficients has the wrong sign and is statistically significant, the set of 
exclusions consists of industries that the interest groups in the corresponding sector would 
least like to have excluded. 
One possible outcome is that both coefficients for one country are found to equal zero. 
This would mean that the set of exclusions does not conform to the wishes of interest groups 
in either the import sector or the export sector of that country, which could occur if the 
government of that country had no bargaining power during negotiations. Another possible 
outcome is that all coefficients have the predicted signs, but the coefficients for one country 
are larger in magnitude than the coefficients for the other country. This would imply that the 
wishes of interest groups in all four sectors were given positive weightings during 
negotiations, but these weightings were larger for one country. This could occur as a result of 
either greater bargaining power or lower total net gains in that country. 
 
4.2 Data Sources 
The empirical analysis on equation (8) is conducted at the six-digit level of the 
1996 "Harmonized System" (henceforth 1996 HS) of product classification, developed by the 
World Customs Organization. At this level of disaggregation, the 1996 HS comprises 
approximately 5,000 categories of goods produced by manufacturing industries. The 
empirical analysis requires a substantial data set, which is collected from a number of 
 19different sources.
6 For 2,675 of the six-digit categories in the 1996 HS, data are available for 
all required variables. Thus, the data set consists of 2,675 data points for each variable. 
The dependent variable in equation (8),  , is a binary indicator variable that equals one if 
industry  i is excluded from the Australia-United States FTA, and zero otherwise. This 
variable is constructed from the official tariff schedules of the two countries under the 
agreement, which were obtained from the Australian government (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Australia, 2005). The tariff schedules show that for most goods, import 
tariffs were either removed completely and immediately by both countries (effective 
1 January 2005, when the FTA came into force), or pre-FTA trade was already tariff-free and 
hence no change was required. Some goods were (or still are) subject to transition periods of 
varying lengths, during which tariffs in one or both countries were progressively reduced to 
zero. For a small additional group of goods, existing pre-FTA tariffs were left unchanged. The 
variable   is constructed by classifying a product category as "excluded" if, for any good 
within that category, import tariffs or quotas are scheduled to remain in force for at least 
seven years, in either country, following the introduction of the FTA. This includes all 
product categories containing goods that are completely excluded from the agreement, and 
some categories containing goods subject to extended transition periods. The original data are 
classified according to the 2002 revision of the HS, so the resulting data series is also 
converted to the 1996 HS. 
i y
i y
The data for   reveal that, of the 2,675 product categories in the data set, 458 (17.1%) 
are excluded from the agreement by Australia, and 524 (19.6%) by the United States. Most 
excluded categories are simultaneously excluded by both countries, and in total, 566 (21.2%) 
i y
                                                 
6 See Weber (2005) for more detail on data sources and the resulting data set. 
 20are excluded by one or both countries. The set of exclusions consists mostly of agricultural 
industries, food/beverages/tobacco industries, and textiles/clothing/footwear industries. 
The indicator variable for political organisation in Australia,  , equals one if industry i 
is represented by a special interest group that makes financial contributions to the Australian 
government in order to influence trade policy, and zero otherwise. This variable is difficult to 
measure, so it is constructed using the indirect method of McCalman (2004), which avoids the 
need for direct measurement by making use of historical information on the operation of 
Australian trade policy. In 1960, Australia abolished a comprehensive system of import 
quotas and replaced these with tariffs. However, replacement tariffs were generally introduced 
only in industries which were the subject of investigative reports by an independent advisory 
body known as the Tariff Board, and these reports were almost always prepared at the request 
of industry lobby groups. Therefore, in the years following 1960, the Tariff Board prepared 
reports for almost all politically organised industries in Australia, and only very few 
unorganised industries. This makes it possible to identify industries that were politically 
organised at that time. 
Aus
i I
More recent data on the political organisation of industries in Australia are unavailable, so 
 is constructed by defining an industry as politically organised if a Tariff Board report 
was prepared for that industry between 1960 and 1973. The year 1973 marks the last year 
before the Tariff Board was replaced by a newer institution. A list of all Tariff Board reports 
prepared during this time, classified by industry, is available in Industries Assistance 
Commission (1974). These reports are classified at the four-digit level of the Australian 
Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC) system, which contains 173 manufacturing industry 
classes. A direct conversion table to six-digit 1996 HS product categories does not exist, so 
the data series is first converted to the four-digit level of the newer Australian and New 
Aus
i I
 21Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) system, and then to the four-digit level 
of the second revision International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev 2) system. 
To minimise the loss of information during these conversions, the value of the indicator 
variable is averaged in cases where several ASIC classes correspond to one ANZSIC class, or 
several ANZSIC classes correspond to one ISIC Rev 2 group. Then, using a conversion table 
from the World Bank's Trade and Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2001), the data 
series is converted from four-digit ISIC Rev 2 to the six-digit level of the 1996 HS. 
The political organisation variable for the United States,  , is taken from Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999), who construct this variable directly from data on campaign contributions made 
by individual firms during the 1981–1982 United States congressional elections. An industry 
group is defined as politically organised if total campaign contributions by firms within that 
industry group are greater than some threshold. Industries are classified according to the 
three-digit level of the 1972 United States Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, 
which contains 143 manufacturing industry groups. For the empirical analysis in this paper, 
the data series is first converted to the three-digit level of the 1987 SIC, and then to the 
six-digit level of the 1996 HS. The conversion from 1972 SIC to 1987 SIC is done using a 
concordance table by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000), and the conversion from 




The variable   is defined, for industry i in country J, as the ratio of domestic output to 
bilateral imports from the FTA partner (positive) or bilateral exports to the FTA partner 
(negative). For Australia, output data are obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS, 2002), and consist of "industry gross output" figures for the year ending 30 June 1998. 
These data are converted from Australian dollars to US dollars using the average exchange 
J
i z
 22rate for the year ending 30 June 1998, which is also obtained from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS, 2005). The data are then converted from the four-digit level of the ANZSIC 
system to the four-digit level of ISIC Rev 2. For the United States, output data are primarily 
from the World Bank's Trade and Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2001), and also 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2005). These data consist of "total output" 
figures for the year ending 31 December 1998, and are classified at the four-digit level of 
ISIC Rev 2. 
The bilateral trade data for   are all from the World Bank's Trade and Production 
database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2001). Only import data are used, since import data are 
usually of a higher quality than export data. Thus, for each country, bilateral imports are 
measured directly and bilateral exports are measured as the value of imports reported by the 
partner country. The data are for the year ending 31 December 1998, and are classified 
according to the four-digit level of ISIC Rev 2. In the raw data, however, two-way trade is 
found to occur in every industry group, which conflicts with the assumption of Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) that only one-way trade is possible within each industrial classification. To 
reflect this assumption,   is calculated using the value of net bilateral trade in each industry, 
where net bilateral trade is defined to be positive if imports outweigh exports, and negative if 
exports outweigh imports. In the majority of industries, net bilateral trade consists of exports 
by the United States and corresponding imports by Australia; relatively fewer product groups 





It should also be noted that the import regressors ( )
J
Mi e z I / ×  are defined only for 
industries that experience net imports, and the export regressors ( )
J
Xi e z I / ×  are defined only 
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)
 if industry i (in country J) is an industry with net exports, and   is set equal to 
zero during the calculation of   if industry i experiences net imports. Finally, the 
resulting data series for   is converted from four-digit ISIC Rev 2 to six-digit 1996 HS 
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The remaining variable,  , is the elasticity of import demand (positive) for industries 
that experience net imports, and the elasticity of export supply (negative) for industries that 
experience net exports. The import demand elasticities in   are taken from Kee, Nicita, and 
Olarreaga (2004), who provide estimates of these elasticities at the six-digit level of the 
1996 HS, for a large sample of countries. Estimates of export supply elasticities do not exist at 
this level of disaggregation, so (following Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara, 2001) the 









The aim of this paper is to test whether the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model, through 
equation (8), can predict the set of industry exclusions for the Australia-United States FTA. 
This test is performed using binary logistic regression, since the dependent variable in 
equation (8) is a binary indicator variable. In addition to the four regressors and intercept term 
shown in equation (8), the model also contains dummy variables for certain "sections" of the 
1996 HS product classification system. The 1996 HS is composed of twenty-one such 
sections, each of which consists of a group of related product categories. Dummy variables 
are included for HS sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, and 13. These dummy variables and the 
 24intercept term are all found to be highly significant, and all possible additional dummy 
variables for other HS sections are statistically insignificant. The inclusion of these seven 
dummy variables is also strongly favoured by a likelihood ratio test, by the Akaike 
information criterion, and by the Schwarz criterion. 
 
Model Fit 
The regression results show that the model fits the data set very well. The hypothesis that 
the four regressors in equation (8) are jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected by a likelihood 
ratio test and a Wald test (with four degrees of freedom). By most measures of model fit, the 
model performs well: the percentage of concordant observation pairs is 95.4, the Goodman-
Kruskal gamma statistic is 0.917, Somers' D statistic is 0.913, the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve is 0.956, Kendall's tau-a statistic is 0.305, and the Nagelkerke 
R
2 is approximately 0.72. A Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test at a 5% significance 
level indicates evidence of a lack of fit in the model, but at a 1% significance level this 
finding is reversed. 
 
TABLE 1. CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
Predicted 
Observed  yi = 1  yi = 0 
Percentage         
correct 
yi = 1 







Percentage  correct  74.1 95.4 90.3 
 
 
 25The explanatory power of the model can also be demonstrated using a classification table, 
as shown in Table 1. This table displays frequency values and percentages describing the 
model's success rate in predicting the value of the dependent variable  . The percentages are 
high, which implies that the model performs well. The figures in Table 1 are calculated using 
a probability level of 0.60, which means that predicted values of   greater than 0.60 are 
classified as being equal to 1 (excluded from the FTA), and predicted values lower than 0.60 
are classified as being equal to 0 (not excluded from the FTA). For a probability level of 




Estimates of Coefficients 
The model coefficients in equation (8) are denoted  1 β ,  2 β ,  3 β , and  4 β . Table 2 displays 
the maximum likelihood estimates of these coefficients, as well as the corresponding standard 
errors, Wald statistics,
7 and two-tailed p-values. Note that the model contains an intercept 
term and seven dummy variables in addition to the parameters shown in Table 2. The 
expected signs of the coefficients (see section 4.1) are  0 1 ≥ β ,  0 2 ≤ β , 0 3 ≥ β , and  0 4 ≤ β , 
if  the two countries are assumed to be symmetric. Table 2 reveals that the estimates of 
1 β ,  2 β , and  3 β  (the import coefficient for Australia, the export coefficient for Australia, and 
the import coefficient for the United States) have the predicted signs and are statistically 
significant, while the estimate of  4 β  (the export coefficient for the United States) is 
statistically insignificant and has the wrong sign. 
 
                                                 
7 The Wald statistics have a chi-squared distribution, with one degree of freedom, and are 
calculated as the square of the maximum likelihood estimate divided by the square of the 
standard error. 




likelihood estimate  Standard error  Wald statistic  p-value 
1 β ,    ()
Aus
Mi e z I / × 8.54 x 10
-3 1.65 x 10
-3 26.78 0.0000 
2 β , ()  
Aus
Xi e z I / × -1.15 x 10
-1 4.80 x 10
-2 5.69 0.0171 
3 β , ()  
US
Mi e z I / × 1.49 x 10
-3 6.42 x 10
-4 5.41 0.0200 
4 β , ()  
US
Xi e z I / × 8.73 x 10
-7 2.64 x 10
-6 0.11 0.7410 
 
 
These findings can be interpreted as follows. Since the estimates of  1 β  and  3 β  are 
positive and statistically significant, interest groups representing import-competing industries, 
in either country, were successful at increasing the probability of having their industries 
excluded from the FTA. Since the estimate of  2 β  is negative and statistically significant, 
interest groups representing export industries in Australia were successful at reducing the 
probability of exclusion for their industries. By contrast, since the estimate of  4 β  is 
insignificantly different from zero, interest groups representing export industries in the United 
States were, on average, not able to reduce the probability of exclusion for their industries. 
 
TABLE 3. RELATIVE MAGNITUDES OF COEFFICIENTS 
Hypothesis  Wald chi-square statistic  p-value (one-tailed) 
0 3 1 = − β β  (importers)  15.85 0.0000 
0 4 2 = − β β  (exporters)  5.69 0.0086 
 
 
 27If the countries are symmetric, the theory also predicts that there will be no significant 
differences in magnitude between the estimates of  1 β  and  3 β , and between the estimates of 
2 β  and  4 β . Table 3 displays the results of Wald tests (with one degree of freedom) of the 
hypotheses 0 3 1 = − β β  and  0 4 2 = − β β . The first hypothesis tests whether, overall, the 
interest groups in the import-competing sectors of the two countries had approximately equal 
influence over the choice of industry exclusions, and the second hypothesis tests whether, 
overall, the interest groups in the two countries' export sectors had approximately equal 
influence. Both hypotheses are strongly rejected in favour of the alternate hypotheses, which 
are 0 3 1 > − β β  and  0 4 2 < − β β . The result  0 3 1 > − β β  indicates that the Australian import-
competing sector had greater influence than the US import-competing sector over the choice 
of industries to exclude from the FTA, and  0 4 2 < − β β  implies that the Australian export 
sector had greater influence than the US export sector over the choice of industries not to 
exclude. Therefore, the set of industry exclusions largely reflects the wishes of Australian 
interest groups. 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that it is incorrect to assume that the two countries 
are symmetric. As discussed in section 4.1, this could either mean that Australia had greater 
exogenous bargaining strength during negotiations, or that Australia received lower total net 
gains from the agreement. On a more fundamental level it can also be concluded that, since 
the estimates of the model coefficients are compatible with certain theoretical scenarios, and 
since there is a high degree of model fit, the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model is successful at 
predicting the set of industry exclusions for the Australia-United States FTA. 
 
 28Robustness and Sensitivity 
The seven dummy variables included in the regression model were chosen based on the 
properties of the data set, and do not have any theoretical justification. Therefore, it is 
desirable to show that the regression results are robust to the choice of dummy variables. To 
accomplish this, tests were performed for an alternate model containing dummies for all but 
one of the "sections" of the 1996 HS (or equivalently, a model with no intercept term but with 
dummies for all sections). For this alternate model, the estimates and significance levels of the 
coefficients  1 β ,  2 β ,  3 β , and  4 β  are almost identical to the results obtained for the original 
model. The regression results are therefore robust to the inclusion of extra dummy variables. 
Moreover, the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz criterion (both of which penalise 
additional regressors) show the alternate model to be inferior to the original model. 
Another robustness test was conducted by repeating the empirical analysis using probit 
regression, rather than logistic (or logit) regression. Probit regression and logistic regression 
are both designed to be used with data sets containing categorical dependent variables, and 
usually the two techniques generate approximately the same results. This is indeed found to 
be the case for this data set. A probit regression on equation (8), with seven dummy variables 
included, generates results that are similar to those reported earlier for the logistic regression. 
In particular, the estimated signs of the model coefficients are unchanged. The statistical 
significance of the estimates of  1 β ,  2 β , and  3 β  is somewhat increased, but the estimate of  4 β  
ains statistically insignificant.  rem
The sensitivity of the logistic regression results to changes in the data was investigated by 
making various changes to the data set, and repeating the logistic regression analysis (with 
seven dummy variables included, as previously). For the political organisation variables, this 
 29was done by re-classifying all industries as politically organised in both Australia and the 
United States, and using the resulting values of the regressors to repeat the empirical analysis. 
The results show the model fit to be poorer than for the original model, which indicates that 
the political organisation variables significantly improve the explaining power of the model. 
Furthermore, the estimates of the coefficients  1 β ,  2 β ,  3 β , and  4 β  are all statistically 
insignificant, which implies that the explaining power of the regressors is insignificant 
without the political organisation variables. These findings provide further support for the 
Grossman-Helpman (1995) model, since the political organisation variables represent a 
crucial component of the Grossman-Helpman framework. 
For the import demand elasticity variables, the sensitivity of the results was investigated 
by setting all import demand elasticities equal to unity, in both Australia and the United 
States. This change to the data set is found to have only a relatively minor effect on the 
results. The estimated magnitudes and Wald statistics of the first three model coefficients 
( 1 β ,  2 β , and  3 β ) are increased, but the signs of these three coefficients are unchanged. The 
estimate of  4 β  is negative instead of positive, but remains statistically insignificant. Thus, the 
logistic regression results are not likely to be sensitive to measurement error in the values of 
the import demand elasticities. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using the empirical methodology of Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2001), the 
Grossman-Helpman (1995) political economy model of FTA negotiations has been shown to 
be successful at predicting the set of industry exclusions for the Australia-United States FTA. 
The regression results reveal a high degree of model fit, and the estimates of the model 
 30coefficients are compatible with certain theoretical scenarios. This provides strong empirical 
support for the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model, and more generally, further adds to the 
evidence supporting the Grossman-Helpman approach towards modelling the influence of 
special interest groups over trade policy. 
From the results of the empirical analysis, several inferences can also be made about the 
Australia-United States FTA. The estimated signs of the model coefficients indicate that in 
both Australia and the United States, interest groups representing import-competing industries 
were successful at increasing the probability of having their industries excluded from the 
FTA, and in Australia, interest groups representing export industries were successful at 
reducing the probability of exclusion for their industries. However, interest groups 
representing export industries in the United States were not successful at lowering the 
probability of exclusion for their industries. In addition, the relative magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients indicate that overall, the Australian import-competing sector had 
greater influence than the US import-competing sector over the choice of industry exclusions, 
and the Australian export sector had greater influence than the US export sector over the 
choice of industries not to exclude. 
These results suggest that Australia and the United States are not "symmetric", which 
implies either that Australia had greater exogenous bargaining strength during negotiations for 
the FTA, or that the overall gains from the agreement are smaller for Australia than for the 
United States. The model does not offer a preference between these two explanations, so 
either, or both, may be correct. However, if it is assumed that the bargaining strength of the 
United States was at least equal to that of Australia, then the results imply that the overall 
gains from the FTA are smaller for the government of Australia than for the government of 
the United States. This is because the government that is offered lower overall gains is more 
likely to abandon negotiations if it is not given the industry exclusions that it desires, which 
 31induces the other government to grant those exclusions more readily. As a result, as is 
observed for Australia, the government that achieves lower overall gains is granted a 
relatively larger number of industry exclusions. 
One limitation of this paper is that the empirical analysis is restricted to goods produced 
by manufacturing industries. The data set does not contain any data for tradeable services, or 
for tradeable raw materials (such as those produced by the agriculture, fishing, forestry, and 
mining sectors). Tradeable services and raw materials constitute a significant portion of 
bilateral trade between Australia and the United States, so these omissions may affect the 
results. Another limitation is that the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model assumes that only 
one-way trade is possible within each industrial classification. The actual bilateral trade data 
for Australia and the United States show that two-way trade occurs within every industrial 
classification, so this assumption is violated. This is addressed by using net bilateral trade 
figures (instead of actual bilateral trade figures) in the empirical analysis, but this may be only 
an imperfect remedy. A further limitation is that the model does not directly reveal whether 
the Australia-United States FTA is beneficial or harmful to consumers in the two countries. 
Instead, the focus of the model is on the effects on interest groups, and the influence that 
interest groups have over the governments of the two countries. While this may be an accurate 
representation of the political process in modern democracies, it is often also desirable to 
know the precise effects of an FTA on consumers. 
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